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Abstract 
The United Kingdom 2015 General Election campaign was mostly dominated by the issues of 
immigration, public debt and income inequality. While most political parties adopted austerity-
led programmes in order to reduce the level of public deficit, their stances on immigration vary 
significantly despite the two main parties converging on a welfare chauvinist frame. This paper 
compares party positions to policy recommendations formulated by participants in a 
democratic forum as part of the "Welfare States Futures: Our Children's Europe" project, in 
order to determine whether recent party pledges on immigration are being used by citizens in 
a large group discussion over the future of welfare policy in the UK. The analysis shows that 
while participants are committed to tougher policies in order to reduce existing levels of net 
migration, most of the policy priorities formulated do not match those of the two mainstream 
parties (i.e. the Conservative Party and the Labour Party) but rather those of the UK 
Independence Party. It also demonstrates that participants' individual political preferences do 
not seem to match their own positions on immigration, and that there is little difference between 
left-leaning and right-leaning voters. 
 
Keywords: Party politics; United Kingdom; public opinion; immigration; democratic forum. 
Introduction 
The year 2015 marked the start of political change in the United Kingdom (UK). After five 
years of coalition government between the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats under 
David Cameron, the Conservatives obtained the majority of seats following the General 
Election held on 7 May 2015. As a result, David Cameron formed a single party majority 
government. The Conservatives were thus able to adapt their party manifesto into a government 
programme, which included a pledge to hold a referendum on European Union (EU) 
membership (held on 23 June 2016, when 51.9 per cent of voters opted for leaving the EU after 
DFDPSDLJQPRVWO\IRFXVHGRQWKHLVVXHRILPPLJUDWLRQWRFXWGRZQQHWPLJUDWLRQµLQWKHWHQV
RI WKRXVDQGVQRW WKHKXQGUHGVRI WKRXVDQGV¶ &RQVHUYDWLYH3DUW\DQG WR UHIRUP WKH
welfare system while cutting down taxes.  
While political discourse and party manifesto analyses have mostly focused on their impact on 
policy-making (see e.g. Schmidt 2002; Leruth 2015) or on a how public opinion shapes party 
stances (e.g. Hills 2002; Adams et al. 2004; Norris and Lovenduski 2004; Bale and Partos 
2014), few qualitative studies analysed the role of party stances (or more broadly elite 
discourse) on public discourse (see e.g. Slater 2014).  
This paper explores whether political discourse and key statements formulated by political 
parties are being used in discussions between ordinary people. Using data from innovative 
democratic forums conducted within the framework of a NORFACE-funded project entitled 
µ:HOIDUH 6WDWHV )XWXUH 2XU &KLOGUHQ¶V (XURSH¶ :HOI62& WKH SDSHU FRPSDUHV SDUW\
positions (as laid out in their party manifestos) with policy recommendations formulated by 
participants in our democratic forums. This paper focuses on the issue that was selected by our 
participants as the most urging challenge for the future of the welfare state, namely 
immigration. This issue was also heavily discussed during the 2015 and 2017 General Election 
campaigns, and in the context of the 2016 Brexit referendum campaign, as a majority of 
µLeave¶ voters expressed concerns over immigration (Hobolt 2016). The second section of this 
paper contextualises the debate: based on the election campaign, it explains why immigration 
constituted the core of the 2015 campaign and highlights the key stances taken by political 
parties in England.1 The third section focuses on the research methods: it explains the added 
value of democratic forums and why such method can help researchers to understand how 
political discourse matters to ordinary citizens, by analysing how it is being used in interactions 
within small and large groups. The fourth section focuses on individual statements and policy 
recommendations formulated by participants to our democratic forums, and compares them to 
party positions highlighted in section two. The fifth and final section then concludes by stating 
that even though a majority of democratic forum participants identified themselves as Labour 
or Conservative voters and in the centre of the left-right political spectrum, their position and 
policy recommendations on immigration matched those advocated by the UK Independence 
Party (UKIP).  
 
Party positions and public opinion on immigration: the state of the art 
 
Public attitudes towards immigration in the United Kingdom have been covered extensively in 
the exiting literature, mostly drawing on data from the British Election Study and the British 
Social Attitudes surveys (see e.g. McLaren and Johnson 2007; Ford 2011; Ford and Goodwin 
2014; for surveys conducted by IPSOS-MORI, see e.g. Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014; Blinder 
2015; Blinder and Allen 2017). The starting point of many existing studies is to deconstruct 
immigration into several groups, either per region of origin (e.g. Ford 2011) or, most 
commonly, by dissociating economic migrants from refugees and asylum seekers (e.g. Sales 
2002; Blinder 2015;   Several studies have examined the relationship between political parties 
and public opinion. Two schools of thought dominate the existing literature: a bottom-up 
approach, where studies have focused on whether public opinion shapes party positions; and a 




Bottom-up studies have analysed the effect that public opinion has on political parties. In a 
comparative analysis of eight Western European countries, Adams et al. (2004: 608) used data 
from the Comparative Manifesto Project and Eurobarometer survey data oQFLWL]HQV¶OHIW-right 
self-placement to show WKDW µpolitical parties shift their ideological positions in response to 
public opinion when opinion clearly shifts away from the party¶ 7KH\ DOVR IRXQG RXW WKDW
parties do not adjust their ideologies based on past elections results. Schumacher et al. (2013) 
nuanced these findings, demonstrating that party position change as a response to public 
opinion depends on the party¶VRUJDQLVDWLRQDOEDODQFHRIpower. In a study of the evolution of 
the UK Conservative 3DUW\¶VLPPLJUDWLRQSROLF\%DOHDQG3DUWRVKLJKOLJKWHGWKDWHYHQ
WKRXJKSDUW\OHDGHUVKLSSOD\HGWKHPRVWVLJQLILFDQWUROHLQVKDSLQJWKHSDUW\¶VVWDQFHRYHUWKH
ILYHGHFDGHV FRYHUHG FKDQJHV LQSROLF\GLUHFWLRQDUH LQPRVW FDVHVGULYHQE\ µthe need to 
respond to party and public feeling, whether it be triggered by particular cases or by developing 
trends¶LELG-617). In a study of British New Labour between 1997 and 2002, Hills (2002) 
DQDO\VHGZKHWKHUWKHSDUW\¶VQHZVRFLDOVHFXULW\SROLF\ZDV shaped by opinion surveys and 
focus groups, drawing on data from British Social Attitudes survey. The author found out that 
IRUDVLJQLILFDQWOLVWRIVRFLDOVHFXULW\SROLF\DUHDV1HZ/DERXU¶VVWDQFHKDVHYROYHGLQOLQH
with public opinion, while only a minority of policies have been out of line with public 
attitudes. This indicates that public opinion could have shaped social security policy, although 
Hills does suggest that there might be other interpretations of his results.  
According to )UHHPDQ¶V(200DQDO\VLVRIWKHµJDS¶EHWZHHQSXEOLFRSLQLRQDQGSXEOLFSROLF\
in liberal democracies, the public tends to hold restrictive views on immigration, but public 
RSLQLRQLVµVORZHUWRPRELOL]HDQGFU\VWDOOL]H¶)UHHPDQ, while immigration policy 
is shaped by an µoverwhelmingly DGPLVVLRQLVW¶ organised public consisting of employers, 
ethnic advocacy groups, and human rights organisationsZKLFKIRUPWKHEDVLVRIWKHµRUJDQLVHG
SXEOLF¶. Yet, Freeman (1994) also argued that WKH8QLWHG.LQJGRPLVDµGHYLDQWFDVH¶, given 
that until the election of a Labour government in 1997, immigration policy was restrictive in 
line with public opinion (see also Hansen 2000; Statham and Geddes 2006; Hampshire 2009). 
Some scholars, however, claimed that such UK exceptionalism may be overstated (see e.g. 
Somerville and Goodman 2010 for a nuance between economic migration and asylum policy). 
In a recent analysis of immigration policy regimes using British Social Attitudes surveys, Ford 
et al.¶V (2015: 1408) findings suggest that public opinion and public policy are indeed 
LQWHUFRQQHFWHGµ>U@estrictive policy change on immigration is a response to public demand, but 
it is an incremental process even in periods of intense public concern >«@&onversely, liberal 
policy change has occurred when the public is quiescent, and proceeded through sweeping 




As far as the issue of immigration issue is concerned, many studies established that political 
parties are the agenda-setters and influence public opinion. In an article examining the role of 
WKHµRUJDQLVHGSXEOLF¶LQWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP using newspaper sources, Statham and Geddes 
(2006: 266) argued that domestic immigration policy is determined top-GRZQE\HOLWHVµit is 
their dominance over the political environment and the opportunities and incentives it produces 
which decisively shapes the level and contents of pro-migrant and anti-migrant collective 
action¶ Their findings thus contrDGLFW)UHHPDQ¶VZRUNRQWKHLQIOXHQFHRIWKHRUJDQLVHGSXEOLF
over elites in the UK.  In an excellent quantitative analysis of radical right-wing parties and 
YRWHUV LQ VL[ :HVW (XURSHDQ FRXQWULHV 5\GJUHQ  IRFXVHG RQ µDQWL-LPPLJUDWLRQ¶ DQG
µDQWL-LPPLJUDQW¶ IUDPHV ZKLFK GRPLQDWH WKH LGHRORJLFDO SURJUDPPH RI VXFK SDUWLHV DQG
discovered that frames linking immigration to social tension and criminality are very effective 
for mobilising voter support, unlike other frames such as welfare chauvinism or those which 
link immigration to job losses.   
Both schools of thought have been dominated by quantitative analyses of the relationship 
between party positions and public opinion by using structured surveys (e.g. Ford et al. 2015), 
while others have used a mixed methods approach (e.g. Adams et al. 2004). While survey 
research makes a significant contribution to research for example, E\KLJKOLJKWLQJWKHµJDS¶
between public opinion and public policy on immigration across Europe, it also suffers from 
limitations )LUVWO\ VXUYH\ UHVHDUFK WHQGV WR µreify aggregated individual responses, either 
LPSOLFLWO\ RU H[SOLFLWO\ LQWR D µFROOHFWLYH DFWRU¶ D µJHQHUDO SXEOLF¶ ZKR µDFWV¶ WR LQIOXHQFH
immigration policies¶ Statham and Geddes 2006: 249). Secondly, structured surveys are 
relatively weak in exploring issues that are not contained within the prior assumptions of the 
researchers involved in the formulation of survey questions. Thirdly, surveys are weak in 
LGHQWLI\LQJ µQRQ-DWWLWXGHV¶. Some respondents may have no strong views either way but 
construct a response because they feel it is required by the interview situation (Goerres and 
Prinzen 2011).  
Only a few studies are solely based on qualitative methods. Yet, discursive and interactive 
rather than pre-VWUXFWXUHGPHWKRGVDUHEHWWHUHTXLSSHGWRKLJKOLJKWVXFKDIRUHPHQWLRQHGµQRQ-
DWWLWXGHV¶DQGJLYH the opportunity for participants to frame the debate. This paper offers a 
µWKLUG ZD\¶ DQG GHPRQVWUDWHs the strengths of democratic forums as a research method to 
investigate the relations between political parties as public policy actors and public opinion, as 
ordinary citizens are given the opportunity to speak freely about a range of issues with very 
limited input from researchers. The following section introduces democratic forums as a tool 
for investigating this relationship.  
 
Democratic Forums as an Innovative Research Method to Investigate Public Attitudes 
 
The democratic forum approach derives from concerns about the limitations of conventional 
social science methodology and also from more participative approaches in democratic theory. 
Democratic forums are group discussions, typically with 30 to 40 participants and typically 
extended over two or three days. The research topic is loosely defined and the group process is 
designed to allow participants to have greater control over the range of issues to be discussed. 
A deliberative, decision-making element is generally included, in order to give a purpose to the 
discussion and stimulate the exchange of opinions.  
Political and social scientists have become interested in the democratic forum method for two 
main reasons. First, conceptions of democracy have shifted away from that of a system for 
managing consent from a largely passive electorate to one of democracy as an active 
institutional framework for promoting more widespread deliberation and citizen engagement 
(Chambers 2003; Carpini et al. 2005; Mouffe 2009; Dryzek 2010). Second, some attitude 
theorists have moved away from a positivist concept of attitudes as original to an independent 
individual to a more social concept of attitudes as developed through interaction and expression 
in debate. This approach sees attitudes as social constructs, shaped through interaction and best 
understood as characteristics of individuals in social contexts than simply as individual 
attributes (Brown 2011). From this perspective, conventional interview responses are 
inevitably shaped by the interaction between a researcher (interviewer, questionnaire-designer) 
and an interviewee. Democratic forum discussions are the product of a group interaction 
between citizens who frame the discussion with very limited input of researchers and 
moderators. Accordingly, democratic forums differ from other qualitative research methods 
such as focus groups for five main reasons: the length of discussion (a minimum of two days); 
the number of participants (between 30 and 40); the breadth of the topic discussed (unlike much 
more defined issues discussed in focus groups); the very light touch of moderation, allowing 
greater control of the discussion by participants; and the introduction of a more deliberative, 
problem-solving element to the discussion in order to stimulate the exchange of ideas and give 
a purpose to the exercise. 
 
 
Democratic forums permit researchers to examine unprompted discussion and see how 
attitudes change and what influences or strengthens them and how political and other cleavages 
emerge within the group. Researchers can also consider the sources of information people use 
to reinforce their positions, from expert, politicians or media debate through to the experiences 
of family members, neighbours or acquaintances. Democratic forums are typically large 
enough to allow political cleavages reflecting those in the population to emerge and to be 
observed during the deliberations. 
 
The strengths of democratic forums entail corresponding weaknesses. They do not allow 
representative sampling, and so offer an imprecise guide to the pattern of opinions and cannot 
be directed to consider specific aspects of an issue according to a researcher or survey 
FRPPLVVLRQHU¶V presuppositions. They offer a useful alternative approach to gain insights into 
the complexity of attitudes especially in areas where attitude structures may not be well 
understood or may be subject to change. 
 
Case study: Democratic Forums in the United Kingdom 
  
As part of the NORFACE-funded WelfSOC project, we conducted a two-day Democratic 
Forum exercise in Birmingham in October 2015, i.e. five months after the General Election 
and four months before the start of the EU referendum campaign, and at a time when 
immigration was high on the political agenda. The group contained 34 people, broadly 
representative of the English population, all of whom attended the full event and received a 
small financial incentive for doing so. As part of the recruitment process, each participant was 
asked to answer a series of socio-economic and political questions, including their party 
preference (if a General Election was to be held at the time of recruitment) and self-placement 
on the left-right spectrum. Eight participants identified themselves as Conservative voters, ten 
as Labour voters, three as Liberal Democrats voters, and two as UKIP voters while the 
remaining eleven participants were undecided. Furthermore, the majority of participants (18) 
identified themselves in the centre of the left-right spectrum, three on the left, two on the right, 
one as centre-left and another as centre-right, while the rest (10) were undecided. Active party 
members were excluded from the selection during the recruitment process, and participants 
were not expected to have a particular interest for politics or to have read the most recent party 
manifestos. Each participant was given a random number ranging from 40 to 90, in order to 
track individual statements. The two days of discussion were a mixture of plenary sessions and 
break-out group discussions in three groups of 11 to 12 participants to facilitate interaction. 
They took place over two days spaced two weeks apart. As the WelfSOC project aims at 
examining the aspirations, assumptions and priorities of ordinary people about the future 
development of welfare, a broad definition of welfare policy was provided by the lead 
facilitator at the very beginning of the event, in order to make sure that all participants 
understand the context and objectives of the discussion.2   
 
7KHILUVWGD\FRQVLVWHGRIDµQDwYH¶GLVFXVVLRQRIchallenges to the future of welfare policy, in 
order for participants to discuss and formulate themes they consider as the most important ones 
in response to the question. Following a short brainstorm session during which participants 
were tasked to think of problems and challenges for the future of welfare policy, participants 
voted in order to select five of those issues to be discussed throughout the day. These were (in 
order of preference): immigration; lack of money and welfare state financing; unemployment; 
population ageing; and lack of/access to education. Five break-out discussions of 30 minutes 
each then took place throughout the rest of the day in order to discuss each of these five themes. 
The first day was concluded with a plenary session where all participants shared the 
conclusions to their discussions and were given the opportunity to raise questions or request 
information to the research team. The second day took place two weeks later, in order to give 
participants the opportunity to reflect on the issues covered during the first day. A stimulus 
pack containing information requested by the group drawn mainly from official statistical 
sources, covering immigration, resources and public spending on welfare, unemployment, 
population ageing and access to educational opportunities, was distributed between the 
meetings and introduced and discussed at the beginning of the second day. The second day was 
structured around the five broad themes which formed the basis of the comparative study: 
income inequality; immigration; gender; intergenerational issues; and labour market. These 
themes corresponded closely to those generated spontaneously in the first day forum with the 
exception of gender. The participants, divided into the same three break-out groups as on Day 
1, were asked to formulate a series of policy recommendations on each of these themes ± these 
are used in the analysis below. At the end of the event, participants presented their policy 
recommendations in a plenary session for discussion and vote. Interactions were audio and 
video-recorded, with note-taking by three observers providing a check, so that all statements 
could be traced a specific identified individual. 
 
In order to analyse the relations between party positions and policy recommendations made by 
participants to our democratic forums, we start from a top-down approach by assuming that 
political parties play a decisive role in shaping public opinion on the topic of immigration. We 
thus hypothesise that democratic forum participants will adopt a similar stance on immigration 
as the one advocated by the party they support.  
 
A 2014 British Election Study expert survey also showed (somewhat unsurprisingly) that  
parties ranked by experts as right-wing are more opposed to immigration than left-wing ones 
(see Figure 1). Based on the expert survey data and in line with the top-down approach, we 
hypothesise that participants who identified with the right side of the political spectrum will 
hold more restrictive views on immigration. 
Figure 1. Expert Survey of party placements on the left-right scale and immigration 
 
Source: British Election Study 2014. Stance on immigration calculated both in terms impact of 
LPPLJUDWLRQRQWKHFRXQWU\¶VHFRQRP\DQGFXOWXUH 
 
The 2015 UK General Election: immigration as a key issue 
 
After five years of Conservatives ± Liberal Democrats coalition government between 2010 and 
2015, the 2015 UK General Election campaign focused on austerity measures, the need for 
budget balance, immigration and welfare reforms (Taylor-Gooby et al. 2017). The Liberal 
Democrats, who were heavily criticised by public opinion for being considered as responsible 
for the rise of tuition fees in higher education despite their 2010 pledge not to do so, were 
consistently predicted to be facing major losses of seats. The same polls predicted that 
Conservative and Labour parties would fail to secure a majority of seats in parliament, and 
would thus have to rely on smaller parties (such as the Scottish National Party) in order to form 
a coalition (Cowley and Kavanagh 2016). The radical right UKIP, which gained two seats 
through defections, which the incumbents were able to hold in the ensuing by-elections held in 
2014, was perceived as the main challenger to Labour and the Conservatives in a significant 
number of constituencies and consistently polled at around 15 per cent of voting intentions at 
the national level, thus posing a threat to both mainstream parties (Goodwin and Milazzo 2015).  
 
Controlled immigration as a key issue for most parties 
 
Immigration, and most particularly immigration from European Union countries was framed 
as one of the most urgent issues in the 2015 General Election campaign. In 2015, 11 per cent 
of the UK population was foreign-born, in line with other Western European countries such as 
France and Germany. However, net migration has consistently been on the rise, reaching a 
record of 298,000 in the year ending September 2014 despite the 2010-2015 coalition 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VSOHGJHWRUHGXFHWKHVHILJXUHV(YHQWKRXJKPRVt immigrants come from non-
EU countries (47 per cent in 2014), most of the debate targeted EU citizens coming to the 
United Kingdom (37 per cent in 2014; with the remaining 16 per cent being British nationals 
returning to the UK).  
,QLWV*HQHUDO(OHFWLRQPDQLIHVWR WKH&RQVHUYDWLYH3DUW\SOHGJHGWRµNHHS
[their] ambition of delivering annual net migration in the tens of thousands, not the hundreds 
RIWKRXVDQGV¶:KLOHLPPLJUDWLRQLVIUDPHGDVKDYLQJDSRVLWLYHLPSDFW on the United Kingdom 
E\EULQJLQJµUHDOEHQHILWVWR%ULWDLQ± WRRXUHFRQRP\RXUFXOWXUHDQGRXUQDWLRQDOOLIH¶LELG
WKHSDUW\VWDWHG LWVZLOOLQJQHVV WR WDFNOHXQFRQWUROOHGPLJUDWLRQZKLFK LQ WKHLUYLHZV µSXWV
pressure on schools, hospitals and transport; and it can cause social pressures if communities 
ILQGLWKDUGWRLQWHJUDWH¶LELG7KHSDUW\SURJUDPPHHPSKDVLVHGVL[NH\SROLFLHVILUVW WR
reduce EU migration by reforming welfare rules, preventing EU citizens from claiming tax 
credits and child benefits if they have not lived in the UK for a minimum of four years; second, 
to negotiate with the EU in order to strengthen border control and introduce stronger powers to 
deport criminals; third, to keep on cutting immigration from outside the EU by introducing 
tougher visa rules; fourth, to include tougher rules to deport illegal immigrants; fifth, to tackle 
people trafficking and exploitations; and finally, to tackle the negative effects of high 
LPPLJUDWLRQRQSXEOLFVHUYLFHVHJµKHDOWKWRXULVP¶) and in local communities.  
Controversially and in contrast to policies advocated for the past 10 years3, the Labour Party 
also insisted on tougher immigration controls in its 2015 manifesto. Even though the 
SURJUDPPH DOVR HPSKDVLVHV WKH EHQHILWV RI LPPLJUDWLRQ IRU WKH 8QLWHG .LQJGRP µ>R@XU
economy and our society benefit from the talent and investment of people who come here, 
LQFOXGLQJ XQLYHUVLW\ VWXGHQWV FRPLQJ WR VWXG\¶ /DERXU 3DUW\   LW FULWLFLVHV WKH
&RQVHUYDWLYH 3DUW\¶V IDLOXUH WR UHGXFH QHW PLJUDWLRQ DQG WDUJHWV KLJK OHYHOV RI ORZ-skilled 
migration. The party pledged: to strengthen British borders by recruiting an additional 1,000 
borders staff and by introducing stronger border controls in order to prevent criminals from 
entering the UK; to introduce full exit checks; to decrease the number of short-term student 
visas; to keep the existing cap on non-EU migrants; to tackle people trafficking and exploitation 
of migrants; and to prevent all immigrants to claim benefits for at least two years. In sum, as 
IDU DV LPPLJUDWLRQ LV FRQFHUQHG WKH /DERXU 3DUW\¶V PDQLIHVWR PLUURUV SOHGJHV IURP WKH
Conservative Party. This is not a new phenomenon, as Hansen (2014) demonstrated. 
The existing coalition partner, the Liberal Democrats, offered a milder stance on immigration, 
and the party manifesto did not emphasise this issue as much as all other parties. While it is 
DFNQRZOHGJHG WKDW LPPLJUDWLRQ µERRVWV RXU HFRQRP\ DQG KHOSV VWDII RXU SXEOLF VHUYLFHV
HVSHFLDOO\RXU1+6¶/LEHUDO'HPRFUDWVWKHSDUW\DOVRVWUHVVHVZHDNQHVVHVLQWKH
FXUUHQWV\VWHPWKDWOHDGWRDEXVHVDVWKH\µXQGHUPLQHFRQILGHQFHLQLW¶LELG,QRUGHUWRIL[
these issues, the party proposes to restore full entry and exit checks, to double the number of 
inspections on employers, to separate students within official immigration statistics, and to 
condition unemployment benefits to knowledge of English. 
The UK Independence Party has always had a tough stance on immigration since its creation 
as a single issue, anti-EU party in 1993. UKIP began to press the issue of immigration from 
the 2010 General Election onwards. Unsurprisingly, tKHSDUW\¶VPDQLIHVWRZDVKHDYLO\
focused on the issue as well as on EU membership. In contrast to other parties, the UKIP 
programme does not acknowledge the benefits of immigration for the UK; instead, it states that 
µ>L@PPLJUDWLRQ from the EU and the 8.3DUOLDPHQW¶V7UHDVXU\6HOHFW&RPPLWWHHUHYHDOVKRZ
LPPLJUDWLRQKDVGULYHQGRZQZDJHVDQGOHGWRMREORVVHVIRU%ULWLVKZRUNHUV¶8.,3
11). It claims that one house needs to be built every seven minutes in order to meet demand, 
and emphasises that immigration puts strain on healthcare and schools. It also highlights that 
according to opinion polls, immigration is consistently perceived as one of the top three issues 
IRUYRWHUV$QGWKHPDQLIHVWRWRIXUWKHUVWDWHµ>R@XUFXUUHQWLPPLJUDWLRQUXOHVLJnore the wishes 
of the British people. They discriminate in favour of EU citizens and against the rest of the 
ZRUOG¶LELG$VDUHVXOWWKHSDUW\SURSRVHVWROHDYHWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQDQGWKXVWRHQGWKH
freedom of movement of people; to increase the number of border agency staff by 2,500; to 
establish an Australian-style points based system limiting high-skilled work visas to 50,000 per 
annum; to limit access to non-urgent healthcare services and benefits to immigrants who have 
worked for a minimum of five consecutive years; and to prevent criminals from entering the 
country and deporting migrants who commit crimes in custodial sentence. 
These pledges appear to reflect differences in public attitudes. The 2015 British Election 
Survey shows that by the time of the election 84 per cent of Conservative voters as against 63 
per cent of Labour voters and 66 per cent of Liberal Democrat voters believed too many 
immigrants had been allowed to enter the country (British Election Study 2015). The 
proportion of Labour and Lib Dems voters who believed that immigration had been excessive 
is striking and may help explain why party manifestos made concessions to curb immigration. 
Our democratic forum data allows us to explore public attitudes in some details and examine 
why people had moved against immigration. 
 
Empirical analysis: comparing party pledges with policy recommendations formulated 
by democratic forum participants 
 
On both days of discussion, immigration constituted one of the key themes identified by 
participants. All participants believed that current immigration levels are unsustainable for the 
United Kingdom and that something needs to be done in order to lower existing numbers. Yet 
and as expected, the majority of participants made D GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ µHFRQRPLF¶
LPPLJUDWLRQDQGUHIXJHHV$VRQHSDUWLFLSDQWSXWLWµZHDUHDWLQ\LVODQGDQGZHKDYHQ¶WJRW
room for everybody that wants to come here. Especially the people who want to come to make 
money, [«] the people who are trying to get here from Syria and all thDWWKDW¶V different, they 
DUHUHIXJHHV¶>8.-44, Conservative voter, centre]. Allowing refugees to enter the country did 
not constitute the core of the discussion: as a result, participants did not formulate policy 
recommendations related to refugees.  $VIDUDVµHFRQRPLF¶PLJUDWLRQLVFRQFHUQHGZKLOHSDUW\
and government positions where not explicitly mentioned, several participants made statements 
similar to the discourse used by UKIP and this was reflected in the policy recommendations 
advocated by the group.  
Policy recommendation #1: µIntroducing an Australian-style points-based system to cap 
immigration¶ 
The first element of convergence in the discussion on immigration is the need to cap 
LPPLJUDWLRQ ,Q WKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶ views, capping immigration is necessary in order to avoid 
mass unemployment, especially due to existing inflows of unskilled workers:  
µ,W¶V DQ LVVXH EHFDXVH LW¶V SUREDEO\ UHVWULFWLQJ RXU %ULWLVK FLWL]HQV IURP KDYLQJ
access to you know, like education, to MRERSSRUWXQLWLHV,W¶VVLPSO\EHFDXVH\RX
know we have Europeans and other people from around the world coming in and 
LW¶VUHVWULFWLQJDQGWDNLQJDOOWKHRSSRUWXQLWLHVWKDWZHFRXOGSRVVLEO\KDYH¶>8.-
40, no party preference, centre].  
µ,W¶VRXUOLWWOHLVODQG¶>8.-41, no party preference, centre]. 
µ7KHDPRXQWRIXQHPSOR\PHQWLVJRLQJWRLQFUHDVHEHFDXVHWKH\¶UHQRWPRQLWRULQJ
ZKLFK WKH SHRSOH FRPLQJ LQWR WKH FRXQWU\ ,W¶V QRW EHLQJ PRQLWRUHG VR \RX¶UH
having more unskilled, unemployable people coming iQ¶ >8.-51, UKIP voter, 
centre]. 
Mass immigration was also perceived as putting a strain on public services, especially the 




see why people would want to come here, free healthcare, free education, there are 
lots of benefits, but then the Government does need the benefit back somehow 
LQVWHDGRIWDNHWDNHWDNH¶  [UK-62, Labour, centre]. 
>«@ 
µ:HORRNHGDWpublic services in terms of the NHS suffering due to overcrowding 
so pretty much a link on from that and not having enough resources to cope. 
Housing, another issue due to overcrowding, not enough housing. The sort of lack 
of control and regulations in terms of letting in skilled and unskilled people into 
WKLVFRXQWU\7KDW¶VJRLQJWRSRVHDSUREOHPLQWHUPVRI,JXHVVKDYLQJDQHTXDl 
society in many respects, as to where are they placed and that being the problem, 
specifically with the unskilled migrants coming over to this country, not having 
anything really to offer but taking up space in the country so that was that. Some 
of the solutions that we noted down where, again having some kind of system in 
place and all the, I guess at the borders, looking at say, can you, having a team of 
people to sort of, I guess monitor the numbers that are coming in, in some way. We 
GRQ¶WNQRZKRZZHNLQGRIGLGQ¶WFRPHWRVRUWRIFRQFOXVLRQRQWKDW¶>8.-83, no 
voting preference, no self-placement] 
Moderator: So monitoring rather than restricting? 
µ, JXHVV , WKLQN ERWK UHDOO\ Restricting in terms of who can bring something 
specific, something valuable intRWKLVFRXQWU\>«@RQO\DOORZLQJDFHUWDLQTXRWD
LQ WHUPVRIWKHVL]HRIRXUSRSXODWLRQDQGWKHIDFW WKDWZH¶UHDVPDOO LVODQGDQG
maybe having some kind of consensus with the EU so that we [want] some kind of 
agreement with everybody - everybRG\¶VGRLQJWKHLUELWWRWDNHLQDFHUWDLQTXRWD
so that was one of our solutions. So talked about a tracking system, controlling who 
FRPHVLQDQGRXW:HORRNHGDWEHQHILWVEHLQJJLYHQ>«@EHQHILWVEHLQJJLYHQWR
those coming over to this country who havHEHHQDOORZHGWRFRPHLQ,IWKH\¶UH
ZLOOLQJWRFRQWULEXWHVRPHWKLQJLIWKH\VD\WKH\GRQ¶WKDYHDVSHFLILFVNLOORUFDQ¶W
ILQGDMREWKDWWKH\¶UHJRLQJWRJHWEHQHILWVRQWKHEDVLVWKDWWKH\FDQPD\EHGR
some, either charitable work or voluntary work sR WKH\¶UH DFWXDOO\ SXWWLQJ
something in and contributing in some sense and that in some respects is an 
LQFHQWLYHWKDWLIWKH\¶UHGRLQJLWIRUIUHHWKDWWKH\¶UHPRUHOLNHO\WRZDQWWRJRRXW
DQGJHWDMREDQGDFWXDOO\JHWSDLGIRULWVRLW¶VDQLQFHQWLYHto get them out into the 
ZRUNIRUFH>«@¶>8.-83, no voting preference no self-placement]  





 µI think the big thing >«@ is let people in that have got a skill that we need¶>8.-
84, Conservative voter, centre]. 
 
 µ<es, a points-based system¶>8.-90, Conservative voter, left-wing]. 
 
µVery similar to Australia¶>8.-83, no party preference, no self-placement]. 
 
µThe thing is ZLWK$XVWUDOLD WKRXJK WKH\¶UHQRWZLWKLQ WKH(8 DUH WKH\" 7KH\
KDYHQ¶WJRWDQ RSHQGRRUSROLF\OLNHZHKDYH¶>8.-84, Conservative voter, centre]. 
 
µSo we need some sort of system that looks at our society in general and says what 
do we need and then hand pick people and  >«@they have got to have a skills set 
that they are bringing in¶ [UK-67, Labour, no self-placement]. 
 
µI would agree¶>8.-62 Labour, centre]. 
 
The introduction of an Australian-style points-based system to cap immigration was 
formulated as such by the spokespersons of break-out groups: 
 
µ:HIHHOWKDWZHGRQ¶WPRQLWRULWFORVHO\HQRXJKQRZDQGWKDWVRPHVRUWRIPRQLWRULQJ
needs to be brought in, i.e. maybe an Australian type system where you have to put 
something in in order to come here and if people are going to come here, we discussed that 
there are a lot of people that we know of personally that come here not able to speak the 
language but perhaps there should be some sort of encouragement to learn the language if 
\RX¶UHJRLQJWRFRPHKHUHVRWKDWHYHU\ERG\FDQFRQYHUVHDQGWDONDQG\RXFDQGRDMRE
openly, without needing translators etc. So stricter border controls, making the right people 




Moderator: Any other burning points?  
µ,WKLQNMXVWDFDSUHDOO\MXVWDJHQHUDOFDSRQKRZPDQ\ZHFDQDOORZLQWRWKH
country. So just having some kind of system in place to cap. There has to be, there 
cannot be sort of like an open window as to how many people we can keep letting 
LQ7KH\¶YHJRWWRFDSLWVRPH ZD\WKHUHKDVWREHWKDWLQSODFH¶>8.-83, no voting 
preference, no self-placement]. 
 . 
 
Accordingly, the majority of participants tended to frame economic immigration as having a 
negative impact on the country, and highlighted the need for selective immigration based on 
skills shortage in the United Kingdom. The use of Australia as a lead example for the United 
.LQJGRP¶V IXture immigration policy is particularly striking, as only UKIP mentioned this 
policy in its manifesto.4 It is interesting to note that at the beginning of June 2016 in the context 
of the UK referendum campaign, the introduction of an Australian points-based system was 
used by prominent Vote Leave campaigners including Conservative MPs Michael Gove, Boris 
Johnson, Priti Patel, and Labour MP Gisela Stuart (BBC 2016). This demonstrates that even 
though UKIP only managed to elect one MP in the 2015 General Election, the party managed 
to play an important role in influencing policy proposals.  
 
Policy recommendation #2: µ1o benefits should be given to immigrants before residing in the 
country for a period of minimum two years¶  
 
The second policy recommendation formulated by democratic forum participants focused on 
welfare chauvinism, i.e. restricting access to benefits for migrants in the United Kingdom, as 
advocated by the Conservative Party, the Labour Party and UKIP. One break-out group 
proposed to tackle the perceived abuse of the NHS by conditioning access to healthcare to 
HPSOR\HUVSRQVRUVKLSµor a probation of like two years where they have to support their own 
healthcare in the country, until they've paid into it sufficiently. It could be longer, could be 
shorter¶ >8.-64, Liberal Democrats voter, centre]. This was developed further by another 
group which extended such restriction to all benefits:  
 
µ$ similar thing, you've got to work a period between two and five years before 
you qualify for any benefits. So it's a similar thing. I mean, the benefits, obviously, 
from our point of view are you only get benefits when you put money into the 
V\VWHP>«@So people can't just come in and work for three months or work for 
three weeks and be entitled to loads of different benefits. The advantages from our 
point of view are that then the benefits will go to the people that have been here 
long term and who deserve it¶>8.-84, Conservative voter, centre]. 
 
While the overwhelming majority of participants voted in favour of such policy, only one 
participant voiced concerns and this led to a small debate in the room:  
µWell, my issue is, let's say they've come into the country, fall pregnant and you 
need some care for that child, you can't support that child. Then that creates 
problems for the country itself¶ [UK-67, Labour voter, no self-placement] 
 
µThen they should have stayed in their own country¶ [UK-47, no voting preference, 
no self-placement]. 
 
µWhat if you're a refugee, what do you do then, where do you go?¶ [UK-87, 
Conservative voter, centre]  
 
µThat's a fair point¶ [UK-84, Conservative voter, centre]. 
 
µI suppose that's classed as a refugee package¶ [UK-44, Conservative voter, centre]. 
 
µI think refugee and immigration are two separate issues¶ [UK-66, Labour voter, 
centre-left]. 
 
µSeparate issues, yeah¶ [UK-44, Conservative voter, centre]. 
 
µIn that scenario, you can get the healthcare and you pay for it after¶ [UK-69, 
Labour voter, centre].   
 
µA healthcare loan¶ [UK-84, Conservative voter, centre]. 
 
µYeah, healthcare loan¶ [UK-66, Labour voter, centre-left]. 
 
µAnd then we could employ a team of people to chase up the people that aren't 
paying for their loans¶ [UK-44, Conservative voter, centre]. 
 
µ6RPRUHZRUN¶>8.-84, Conservative voter, centre]. 
 
This position on welfare chauvinism is in line with what was promoted by most political parties 
in the context of the 2015 General Election (with the exception of the Liberal Democrats). 
There were discussions over the amount of time immigrants should work for (or, as framed by 
SDUWLFLSDQWV µFRQWULEXWH WR WKHV\VWHP¶:KLOH WKHRULJLQDOSROLF\ UHFRPPHQGDWLRQVWDWHGD
SHULRGRIµWZRWRILYH\HDUV¶DVGLVFXVVHGDERYHSDUWLFLSDQWVHYHQWXDOO\RSWHGIRUWZR\HDUV








 The third immigration-related policy recommendation formulated by democratic forum 
participants (with unanimous backing) was also related to healthcare tourism, by introducing a 




do that at the moment but not very effectively. So any tourists coming in, you know, 
if they're ill while they're here, like we would if we went abroad and we pay while 
we're there, then we'd do the same and charge it back to their countries. Obviously, 
a disadvantage to that is having to monitor it and how do we do that, and how do 
we link into other countries' systems. But perhaps it might stop people from 
VFDPPLQJWKHV\VWHP¶>8.-44, Conservative voter, centre].  
 
Such policy was not advocated by any political parties per se, but is closely related to the issue 
of tackling abuse of the National Health Service by immigrants as advocated by UKIP. While 
a majority of participants voted in favour of this policy, some voiced their concerns about the 
efficiency of this system, but believed that it is an important issue and that there should be a 





Starting from a top-down approach, this paper has compared party preferences on immigration 
policy in the United Kingdom to policy recommendations IRUPXODWHGE\µordinary¶ citizens in 
the context of a democratic forum, which consisted of a mix of small and large discussion 
groups with very limited input from researchers, thus allowing greater control of the debate by 
participants. Three policy proposals were formulated: the first one favoured the implementation 
of an Australian-style points-based system; the second one was related to welfare chauvinism 
by conditioning access to benefits and services to employment (for a minimum of two years); 
and the third one dealt with the issue of health tourism. While participants made an initial 
distinction between two groups of immigrants, the majority of the discussion focused on 
economic migration, as they expressed some sympathy towards refugees and were more critical 
of migrants moving to the UK for economic reasons. 
Even though more analysis needs to be done in order to determine the extent of the relationship 
between elite and public discourse, this analysis has demonstrated that the majority of 
participants have tended to support and formulate policy recommendations close to those 
advocated by UKIP, even though most of them identified themselves as Conservative and 
Labour voters and in the centre of the political spectrum. As immigration had played a major 
role in the 2015 and 2017 elections and was framed as one of the most important issues in the 
context of the UK referendum on EU membership held a few months after our democratic 
forum, the data collected by WelfSOC shows that party identification and self-placement on 
the left-right political spectrum does not match individual preferences on immigration policies, 
and that there was a broad consensus to favour restrictive policies advocated by the radical 
right. Forum members overwhelmingly favoured a points-based system as proposed by UKIP 
(in the context of the 2015 General Election) and the Vote Leave Brexit campaign. In sum, 
while discussions that took place in the democratic forum were not focused on party politics 
and gave the opportunity for participants to discuss their priorities for the future of the UK 
welfare state openly, our analysis offers a new insight suggesting that UKIP had succeeded in 
JDLQLQJµRZQHUVKLS¶RIthe issue of immigration (Dennison and Goodwin 2015). A wide range 
RISDUWLFLSDQWVVHHPHGLQIDYRXURIWKHSDUW\¶VLPPLJUDtion policy although they did not support 
the party. This is what appears to lie behind the British Election Survey statistics quoted earlier. 
Furthermore, given the way policy recommendations were formulated, this analysis attempted 
to show that public opinion can indeed by influenced by party positions, thus defending the 
top-down approach. The fact that key policy proposals advocated by UKIP (and, to a lesser 
extent, the Conservatives and Labour) were used by participants gives some insights on the 
influence of elites over public opinion. Yet, participants did not explicitly refer to any sources 
of information when formulating their policy recommendations, and did not acknowledge that 
a points-based system was advocated by UKIP or used by the Labour government in 2008. It 
is thus possible that other sources, such as the media or even hearsay, influenced their positions. 
This paper does not claim that democratic forums can replace structured surveys as a means of 
investigating the relationship between party positions and public opinion. Instead, it shows that 
democratic forums are a useful research tool to identify key concerns and issues for voters in a 
specific country because they give participants the opportunity to frame the discussion in a 
stimulating, open environment. In 2016, the Stronger In campaign failed to address most of the 
FLWL]HQV¶FRQFHUQVLQFOXding on immigration. As democratic forums give more opportunities 
for citizens to express their views on a broader topic with very limited input from the research 
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 The analysis focuses on the four largest parties in England: the Conservative Party, the Labour Party, the UK 
Independence Party, and the Liberal Democrats. As the Democratic Forums were held in Birmingham (the third 
largest metropolitan area in the United Kingdom), regional parties such as the Scottish National Party or Plaid 
Cymru are not included in this analysis. Furthermore, no participants indicated the Green Party of England and 
Wales in terms of voting intentions: this party is also excluded from this analysis. 
2
 Welfare SROLFLHVZHUHGHILQHGDVµEHQHILWVDQGVHUYLFHVSURYLGHGE\WKHJRYHUQPHQWLQRUGHUWRPHHWSHRSOH¶V
needs. The main areas are the health service, pensions, benefits for unemployed and low-wage people, benefits 
for people in work, social housing, childcare provisions, rights to paid leave, social care for older people and, in 
some countries, schooling. The welfare state is by far the largest area of government spending, and there are many 
LVVXHVWREHFRQVLGHUHGIRUWKHIXWXUH¶ 
                                                          
                                                                                                                                                                                    
3
 It is worth reminding that the Labour Party allowed full freedom of movement for nationals of the A8 countries 
WKDW MRLQHGWKH(8LQIROORZLQJWKHµ%LQJ%DQJ¶HQODUJHPHQW7RQ\%ODLU¶VWKHQ+RPH6HFUHWDU\'DYLG
Blunkett, claimed not to envisage any upper limits to immigration. 
4
 It should be noted that a points-based system was introduced by the UK Labour government in 2008 for selecting 
non-EU economic migrants. Yet this was not mentioned by participants, who only used the expression of 
µ$XVWUDOLDQSRLQWV-EDVHGV\VWHP¶DVXVHGLQ8.,3¶VSURJUDPPH 
